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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we examine the domestic Europeanization of employment policy 
in two Continental countries — Germany and France. While both countries have 
experienced substantial labour market reforms in the last decade, the reform fields 
differ considerably. This paper argues that this is because the appropriation of 
European resources depends on the domestic patterns of bureaucratic co-ordination. 
Our analysis reveals that, in Germany horizontal co-ordination has fostered a 
discursive strategy of a unit in the labour ministry that contributed to the cognitive 
change towards activation. In France, centralistic co-ordination has blocked the 
labour ministry from substantial discursive strategy, but by a programmatic strategy it 
has contributed to improving existing schemes of insertion. 
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Introduction 
 
After a short period of common prosperity and as a consequence of the financial 
and economic crisis, the member states of the European Union (EU) face again 
major challenges in the provision of welfare and to the goal of full employment. Due 
to rising unemployment, decreasing employment rates and falling tax revenues 
caused by the economic downturn, all member states confront a growing threat of 
increasing social disruptions and growing public debt (European Commission 2010). 
As the crisis shows quite plainly the dense European economic – and eventually 
social – interdependence, the questions on the prospects and boundaries of social – 
and eventually economic – solidarity among European societies are being posed 
again. This makes a coherent and integrated European approach towards economic 
and social cohesion ever more indispensible. While the Lisbon agenda and the 
European Employment Strategy (EES) have proven to be a crucial pillar of a 
coordinated and genuinely European answer to ensuring high employment and social 
cohesion in times of a changing but rather prosperous economy in the years 1998 to 
2008 (Tholoniat 2010; Heidenreich and Zeitlin 2009; Dawson 2009), the years to 
come will be a more demanding challenge. Facing the threat posed to first signs of 
economic recovery by rising public depth in all EU Member States, to give a new 
start to a closer economic, employment and social policy coordination by the EU’s 
2020 strategy will be a major task for the newly elected Commission. Asking for 
solidarity and eventually financial transfers between European societies, the Greek-
Euro crisis frankly demonstrates that a common market and a common currency 
indispensably depend on reducing the broad variety in productivity wages, public 
spending and consequently employment policy coordination. However, being 
institutionalized outcomes of historical conflicts domestic economic, social and 
employment policies are rather resistant to radical changes (Streeck and Thelen 2005; 
Pierson 2000). Characterized by mutual complementarities, and entailing increasing 
returns, these specific, historically evolved, national institutional arrangements are 
subject to major domestic stakeholder interests (Hall and Soskice 2001). Thus, for 
the new start of the strategy it will be crucial to understand, how and why European 
coordination mechanisms do impact domestic institutional reform processes. 
Europeanization thus refers to understanding the mechanisms of domestic 
institutional change (Hedström 2008; Cerami 2009): If so, why and how are 
exogenous resources used in the process of domestic institutional change? 
 
In the post-war period for Continental European countries, the promise of social 
inclusion has relied on relatively equal income structures and social protection. By 
regulative interference in the functioning of markets, these states have succeeded in 
complementing growing economic prosperity by increasing social protection. As a 
consequence of the change from industrial to knowledge based production, 
demographic change and individualization, these institutional arrangements are 
increasing under pressure to reform (Kenworthy 2004, Schmid 2008). Particularly, 
the concentration of employment and social policy on protecting the lifelong 
employment of a male breadwinner seems increasingly dysfunctional (Clegg 2007). 
These countries face a vicious circle of more and more people depending on social 
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insurance, financed by a decreasing number of people participating in the labour 
market (Ebbinghaus 2005, Scharpf 2000). Given these challenges of the European 
welfare state in this ‘new knowledge-based society’ the Lisbon European Council in 
2000 decided to “shape these changes in a manner consistent with its values and 
concepts of society”. The European Employment Strategy (EES) (López-Santana 
2009) might be a crucial pillar of a coordinated and genuinely European answer to 
these challenges. However, does this process of mutual coordination offer sufficient 
incentives, compared to the institutional barriers which are particularly strong in 
Continental Europe (Palier and Martin 2007) – and if so why and how?  
 
 
While there are ample findings indicating that the EES has been impacting 
domestic reforms (Heidenreich and Zeitlin 2009), there seems to be a broad variety 
in terms of policy fields and extent of reforms that has hardly been explained so far. 
Approaches accounting for domestic differences mostly focus on the scope, but 
rarely the content and policy field of reforms (Mailand 2008, López-Santana 2006). 
Contrary to these ‘most-different-design’ studies, we have chosen to analyze two 
Continental countries – Germany and France – that face a comparable level of 
‘institutional misfit’ to EES’ goals on the cognitive and programmatic level, but differ 
considerably in the domestic patterns of administrative coordination. Therefore, we 
may expect findings on the mechanisms of Europeanization in different regulatory 
structures. Building on an actor centered institutionalism (Fligstein 2001) we show 
that depending on the institutional setting, different strategies of appropriation may 
prove effective for domestic actors. We argue that the creative appropriation of 
European resources constitutes a pivotal strategy of skilled social actors – institutional 
entrepreneurs – in order to increase their relevance within the domestic employment 
policy field. However, as a consequence of the necessary coalitions for the 
institutional change project, we expect that these strategies will be in turn shaped by 
the institutionalized structure within this field. Thus, we may formulate three 
hypotheses:  
 
 The characteristic national patterns of bureaucratic co-ordination shape 
the national co-ordination process of the EES.  
 These differences constitute different opportunity structures that favor 
different institutional entrepreneurs and determine their strategies of 
appropriation.  
 If the EES has affected domestic reform processes, the differences in 
national welfare state reforms can be explained by these strategies of 
appropriation. 
 
(1) In order to test these hypotheses, we rely on an actor centered 
institutionalism, which takes into account the role of pre-existing institutions as well 
as of skilled corporate actors (institutional entrepreneurs) in institutional (re-)production 
(cf. Hay and Wincott 1998). (2) By a comparative case study building on a most-
similar system design we aim to reduce the problems of assessing the EES’ impact. 
The analysis itself is conducted in three steps: (3) At first, we present a puzzle of 
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welfare state change: While France and Germany are considered so similar in many 
institutional aspects, both countries have produced very different welfare state 
reforms. (4) We show that the domestic coordination of the EES in both countries 
has been organized according to deeply institutionalized structures of coordination. 
(5) Finally, we show that these differences in domestic opportunity structures have 
favored different strategies of creative appropriation by domestic institutional 
entrepreneurs.  
 
 
Europeanization as Institutional Change: Institutional Entrepreneurs 
as Skilled Actors in Domestic Organizational Fields  
 
The question to what extent the EES is able to influence domestic employment 
regimes refers to a twofold inertia: as institutions employment regimes are subject to 
path dependent evolution and can hardly be shaped by intentional policy making 
(Pierson 2000), and as domestically evolved social order they are deeply rooted in 
national social, economic and political contexts (Rokkan 1973). However, domestic 
institutions of employment policy have actually changed a lot recently (Streeck and 
Thelen 2005). How can we conceptualize and explain this institutional change? What 
processes – and which actors - link the EES and domestic institutions? In order to 
analyze this question, we propose to conceive of Europeanization as dialectic process 
of institutional closure of European fields and the simultaneous opening of 
respective domestic fields (Fligstein 2008, Ferrera 2005); i.e. “formal and informal 
rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’, and shared beliefs 
and norms” become institutionalized on the European level and are “then 
incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures, and 
public policies” (Radaelli 2003: 30). Thus, we are neither interested in the level of 
convergence between institutional settings, nor the harmonization of national law or 
political integration, but the interpretative analysis of the mechanisms and strategies 
that underlie the emergence of mutual European institutions and constitute their 
relevance as a legitimate resource in domestic reform processes (cf. Vink and 
Graziano 2007: 10).  
In order to understand the processes of EU-related institutional change, we 
propose to borrow from an actor-centered institutionalism (Mayntz and Scharpf 
1995). This concept focuses on the rational intention of corporate actors’ strategies 
within institutionalized fields (DiMaggio 1988). These fields are characterized by 
shared set of rules, understandings and power relations that mediate and structure 
the interactions within the field.  
 
They frame the kinds of interests and resources which actors can mobilize in favour of, 
or against, welfare reforms. In part, they also determine who can and who cannot 
participate in the political game leading to reforms. Depending on how these different 
variables are set, different patterns of support and opposition are likely to be encountered. 
(Palier and Martin 2007: 544) 
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But as pre-existing institutions shape what options are perceived as ‘reasonable’ 
the strategic orientation of these actors should not be confused with the mostly un-
intended consequences of their actions (cf. Woll and Jacquot 2010). In this concept, 
Europeanization refers to the interdependent re-production of institutions in the 
practice of two social fields that are mutually oriented towards each other (fig. 1, cf. 
Bulmer 2007). Domestic Europeanization, therefore, depends on whether corporate 
actors in the national field do actively refer to resources of the European field 
(Jacquot and Woll 2003: 5).  
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Figure 1 
 
 
What are the mechanisms and strategies that constitute the increasing domestic 
relevance of resources generated in the European field? We expect that the reason 
for the interest in change of institutional entrepreneurs is due to a meta-game: to 
secure and improve their position within the field, actors have to continuously prove 
their relevance for the joint undertaking – the mission – that constitutes the field 
(Garud et al. 2007). This makes innovation a cornerstone of institutional order: the 
struggles that constitute the field are not only about immediate interests but also 
about the position of actors for future interactions (cf. Bourdieu and Wacquant 
1996). This refers to the relative relevance actors ascribe to one another for solving 
the commonly perceived problems (Crozier and Friedberg 1979). It is this mutual 
ascription of relevance that constitutes the power-asymmetry that exists in every 
social interaction (Friedberg 1993: 113f). The struggles in this dimension are thus on 
the control over and evaluation of material (e.g. qualified personnel) and 
authoritative resources (e.g. evaluation, report or sanctioning capacity) and, thus, 
eventually on the relevance in the eyes of the others. We may thus analytically 
distinguish three mutually non-exclusive strategies that cause institutional entrepreneurs 
to suggest innovations (cf. Woll and Jacquot 2010, Zirra 2010): improving 
organizational capacity (regulatory strategy), proposing new solutions to given problems 
(programmatic strategy) and persuading others of new problems (discursive strategies).  
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(1) In order to be perceived as relevant, actors need to have the ability to 
propose promising new solutions. They may therefore directly refer to exogenous resources in 
order to improve their organizational capacity - quality and quantity of personnel, technique 
or evaluation capacity (Zeitlin 2009). For example, the evaluation demands related to 
the EES and ESF financial resources may contribute to an increased capacity of 
domestic actors (Mailand 2008). The evaluation demands of the EES therefore do 
not only contribute to improved data and indicators but by using these measures the 
labour ministry may improve its position in the interministerial game (Jacobsson and 
West 2009: 202f). Additionally, actors may refer to authoritative resources – e.g. co-
ordination demands in the course of EES – in order to increase their relevance. This 
strategy directly alters the mutually ascribed relevance of actors: it causes changes the 
regulatory power structure in the field. (2) Actors have to prove that their proposed 
actions can successfully be used to solve commonly conceived problems. They may use 
external solutions to propose them as their own concepts in the domestic arena. By this 
programmatic framing, domestic actors try to influence the domestic definition of 
‘appropriate’ policies and instruments to solve given problems. Accordingly, 
European norms on appropriate employment policies may at the same time constrain 
and broaden the scope of ‘legitimate’ alternatives in the domestic arena (López-
Santana 2006: 490ff). (3) It is a fundamental characteristic of social interaction that 
problems do not ‘objectively’ exist but are socially constructed within the field. 
Therefore, institutional entrepreneurs may try to persuade the actors of the field of new problems 
for which they possess the most relevant problem solving capacity from the beginning (cf. Fligstein 
2001: 264). For example, in framing national discourses with world views that have 
been institutionalized at the European level (e.g. equal participation in the labour 
market) those European concepts have increasingly been incorporated in domestic 
discourse (cf. López-Santana 2006: 486ff)  
Finally, while it seems that domestic actors use European resources only to 
further their own interest (Mailand 2008), “by embracing OMC concepts, categories, 
and metrics to advance their own goals, domestic actors at a minimum acknowledge 
and reinforce the discursive legitimacy of common European objectives and policy 
approaches” (Zeitlin 2009: 396). Therefore, even when domestic actors may remain 
unaware of the European connection, the domestic usage of these resources has 
contributed to the implementation of EES. We therefore propose to consider 
Europeanization as an unintended consequence of intentional action rather than a 
conscious and deliberate process. 
 
 
Methodology 
 
The causes and mechanisms of Europeanization are notoriously difficult to 
assess (Haverland 2005). This is particularly true for EES, not only because of the 
variety, complexity, and relative newness of the process, but also because of the 
methodological problems involved in disentangling the independent causal impact of 
an iterative policy-making process based on collaboration between EU institutions 
and Member State governments without legally binding sanctions (Barbier 2004). 
Therefore, our methodological considerations aim at reducing these problems of 
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attribution inevitably connected to the Europeanization hypotheses (Exadaktylos and 
Radaelli 2009) while at the same time trying to avoid ecological fallacies, i.e. 
“assuming ‘if they do something similar to what Brussels want (sic!), they must be 
doing it because of Brussels’” (Radaelli and Pasquier 2007: 40). One important 
research strategy for avoiding these pitfalls is focusing on processes rather than 
outcomes (Vink and Graziano 2007: 15). By in-depth qualitative case studies 
analyzing the course of reform processes in Germany and France, we account for the 
different interests, strategies and orientation of the actors involved in institutional 
change over time (Gerring 2004: 348). However, while it is the strength of qualitative 
design to reconstruct complex causalities, we will not be able to account for the 
relative weight of European resources in domestic reform processes. We may, 
however, give a qualitative appraisal (e.g. whether, how and why the European 
resources have been relevant in the reform process).  
The case studies are based on 44 expert interviews with civil servants in the 
national labour ministries, the European Commission as well as representatives of 
the social partners and regional authorities, all directly involved in the EES or 
domestic labour market reforms, as well as document analysis. Despite two informal 
talks at conferences in 2008, the interviews have been conducted between fall 2005 
and spring 2006. We analyzed and mutually contextualizing these interviews and 
documents by a qualitative content analysis according to Mayring (2003). Accounting 
for the strategic interests of our interviewees (Barbier 2004: 19), we have conducted 
interviews with many representatives from very different organizations involved 
assuming that their respective bias would serve as mutual counterbalance. Finally, 
linguistic artefacts caused by the use of foreign language, are a problem often 
disregarded in comparative research. While both interviewers are native speaking 
Germans, in France we have often tried to avoid these pitfalls by resorting to ‘bi-
lingual’ interviews – asking the questions in English but being answered in French.1 
However, in Brussels, most interviews have been conducted in ‘Eurospeak English’ 
(Barbier 2004: 19).  
So far, most comparative studies on the impact of EES have followed the logic 
of a ‚most-different-system-design‘. Accordingly, they have had to focus on 
explaining similarities (López-Santana 2006) in the appropriation of EES – or had to 
‘explain’ institutional diversity by institutional diversity (Mailand 2008). Only few 
studies on welfare state reform have chosen ‘most-similar’ cases (Parlier and Martin 
2007) shedding light on the similarities and differences within the Continental reform 
path. By choosing Germany and France, we follow the second logic. These 
Bismarckian countries face comparable problems of dual labour markets (Clegg 
2007) and ‘institutional misfit’ to EES policy goals (Börzel and Risse 2003). 
However, apart from these similarities, there are striking differences, particularly in 
respect to the procedural dimension of domestic employment policy (Kassim et al. 
2000, Bulmer 1983). We may therefore expect answers on the mechanisms of 
domestic Europeanization in completely different regulative environments. 
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Different reform paths in Continental Europe 
 
The countries of Continental Europe face considerable needs to modernize their 
welfare and employment policies. For a long time, these institutions have focused on 
protecting the employment of a mostly male, qualified family breadwinner. But this 
has resulted in a rising duality of the labour market and social protection, excluding 
low-qualified, women, and younger as well as older people from the labour market. 
Due to international competition, increasingly knowledge-based organizations, and 
aging society these institutions have become economically, financially and socially 
inefficient (Scharpf 2000). At the same time, Continental welfare states have been 
characterized as “ingrained over-commitment to old institutions and historical 
entitlements” (Kitschelt and Streeck 2003: 28), “frozen continental landscape” 
(Esping-Andersen 1996) or “immovable objects” (Pierson 1998). Accordingly these 
countries had been unable to face structural reforms, assuming „the cards are very 
much stacked in favor of the welfare state ‘status quo’ in these countries” (Esping-
Andersen 1996: 267). However, more recently this view has been increasingly 
criticized as an analytical artefact of the ‘punctuated equilibrium’ concept (Palier and 
Martin 2007, Streeck and Thelen 2005). Hence, in fact the strong segmentation of 
the labour market and social protection can be seen as a consequence of incremental 
– however path dependent – change since the late 1970s (Clegg 2007). Hence, it has 
been exactly the reaction of these states to the economic and social challenges that 
has led to intensifying the social and employment dualism between well protected 
insiders and increasingly marginalized, precarious outsiders. However, after more 
than twenty years of path reinforcing incremental reform, since 2000 there are 
indications for an increasingly radical institutional change in Germany and France 
(Clegg and Palier 2010, Lessenich 2008). How radical have these reforms been? What 
similarities and differences can be found? We expect that even though the challenges 
have been quite similar, due to endogenous logic of institutional reforms there will be 
considerable differences concerning the scope as well as the field of reform.  
 
Germany: Starting the Path to Activation? 
 
In the 1980s, Germany was considered to be the economically and socially most 
successful among Western European countries. The ‘high-production order’ (Streeck 
1997) which has been at the core of the German model was framed by a set of 
complementary and mutually reinforcing institutions (Hall and Soskice 2001) – e.g. 
the strong but cooperative role of industrial social partners, vocational training and 
‘professionalism’. Additionally the system of social protection has been oriented to 
protect the certified and acquired status of the male family bread winner. And even 
when a job got lost, the professional position within society would be sustained by 
the savings-account of social insurance (Palier and Martin 2007). But at the same 
time, the dark side of this congenial regulation of social, economic and employment 
policy became ever more apparent. Exactly those institutions, the success of the past 
was build on, became increasingly problematic (Kitschelt and Streeck 2003). In 
particular, they entailed a high rate of long-term unemployment (3.7 percent in 2000) 
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and a high gender-employment gap (25 percentage points in full time equivalent in 
2000, European Commission 2008).  
Thus, the institutional change in Germany provoked by the labour market 
reforms in 2001 to 2005 are considered to be “among the most amazing 
developments in social policies that occurred in the Western world during that time” 
(Ludwig-Mayerhofer 2005: 95, cf. Eichhorst et al. 2008, Kemmerling and Bruttel 
2006). After the reforms had been initiated by the Job-AQTIV-law in 2001 a ‘job-
placement-scandal’ in the Public Employment Service (PES) created a window of 
opportunity for a complete reorientation of German welfare and employment policy 
(Fleckenstein 2008). These reforms express a basically changed concept of 
employment policy in Germany: While before the central pillar was the demand side 
protection of existing employment, in the reforms, the supply side activation of all 
citizens became the focal legitimizing device (Dingeldey 2007).  
 
Employment policies are now focused on stimulating labour supply and activation 
strategies. Increasing female participation in the labour market and thereby facilitating 
family and work reconciliation is also at the heart of the new social policy paradigm. (Palier 
and Martin 2007: 542) 
 
Thus, it is not the responsibility of the state to include its citizens into the labour 
market anymore, but the responsibility of the individual, who can no longer rely on 
status protecting social insurance (Eichhorst et al. 2008: 60). The state in turn has 
facilitated inclusion by creating a low wage sector and activation tailored to individual 
needs. A major achievement of the reform has been that all unemployed are now 
entitled to the same active labour market policy schemes administered by the PES 
(Ludwig-Mayerhofer 2005). Accordingly, the „tighter conceptual and practical linkage 
of promoting and demanding elements” (Eichhorst et al. 2008a: 27) is considered as 
one of the most coherent and comprehensive activation schemes in Europe. 
Additionally, the changes in unemployment benefits for long term unemployed 
created an unintended “shift from contribution based to tax-funded passive and 
active labour market policy schemes” (Eichhorst et al. 2008: 56). As a consequence, 
the traditional boundaries of entitled and ‘undeserved’ beneficiaries (Lahusen and 
Stark 2003: 369) as well as between labour market and social policy have increasingly 
eroded (Seifert and Struck 2009): By including ‘hidden’ long-term unemployment, the 
UB II scheme „dramatically increases transparency regarding non-employment” 
(Eichhorst et al. 2008: 59). Thus, as a key outcome, the segmentation between short- 
and long-term unemployed became more evident (Dingeldey 2007: 832). But even 
the introduction of this basic income scheme was legitimized by ‘activation of the 
long term unemployed’. And while the reforms have considerably improved the 
placement for short-term unemployed, for the low-qualified, the new schemes did 
not serve as a bridge in regular employment but constitute new ‘inactivity traps’ and 
may even prolong unemployment (Eichhorst et al. 2008: 52ff, Ludwig-Mayerhofer 
2005: 110).  
 
 
14                                 Working Papers on the Reconciliation of Work and Welfare in Europe 
 
France: The State’s Responsibility for Employment  
 
In the post-war era, in France, statist dirigisme in economic and industrial policy 
was accompanied by a considerable role of public employment (Levy 2005). After the 
economic crisis in the late 1970s, the state has increasingly retreated from directly 
intervening into the market (Schmidt 1996), but it has sustained its focal role as 
employer of last resort and in guaranteeing social cohesion. Thus, „the state [was] 
being expected to provide temporary (or ‘secondary market’) jobs when the market 
failed to deliver them” (Barbier and Kaufmann 2008: 94). While additionally to 
demand side policy and early retirement in Germany labour market policy to a large 
extend was build on further education, in France, active labour market policy has 
been the third pillar of employment policy. The scarcity of employment for the low-
qualified was conceived of as being caused by weak economic performance “rather 
than resulting from poor motivation” (Enjolras et al. 2000: 42). Therefore, incentives 
to employers should ensure social inclusion of disadvantaged groups by ‘insertion’ to 
employment. Since the late 1970s the state increasingly created subsidized 
employment for problematic segments in the labour market, instead of direct public 
over-employment – perpetuating the logic of the state as ‘employer of last resort’. 
However, these schemes have often entailed a rising risk of in-work poverty and 
have hardly served as bridge into regular employment (Barbier and Fargion 2004: 
447). Particularly for young people, insertion schemes have often substituted missing 
eligibility (Ughetto and Bouget 2002). The perception „that insertion jobs operating 
outside of the market economy can themselves become exclusion trajectories” 
(Enjolras et al. 2000: 44), very early created a debate on ‘new poverty’, ‘social 
exclusion’ and ‘précarité’ (Paugam 2000). While in 2000 over 20 percent of the 15 to 
25 year olds that have not been in education were unemployed (European 
Commission 2008), at the same time over ten percent of the active population have 
been on subsidized employment schemes (2.8 million employees) (Barbier and 
Fargion 2004: 448).  
The most ambitious and effective among the broad variety of employment 
policy reforms in France between 2000 and 2005 has been the social cohesion plan 
presented in 2004 (Barbier and Kaufmann 2008). This plan has aimed to tackle social 
exclusion by an integrated approach of employment, housing and education policy. 
But it can be considered symptomatic that this plan has been perceived as social 
policy reform rather than of employment policy. In this plan, particularly the rising 
risk of in-work poverty was identified as a crucial threat to social cohesion. Thus, 
while the social cohesion plan – together with reforms as the PARE – has also 
comprised a broad variety of incremental PES reforms (Barbier and Kaufmann 2008, 
Clegg 2007), its focus has been on ‘making work pay’. This has entailed a silent shift 
from financing unemployment to increasingly generalized schemes of subsidizing 
employment (Barbier 2007) and has finally culminated in the introduction of the 
Active Solidarity Income (Revenu de Solidarite Active – RSA) in 2008 (Clegg and Palier 
forthcoming). In this notion of ‘activation’, instead of promoting individual 
employability, the state again assumes the responsibility to actively integrate certain 
groups into employment (Enjolras et al. 2000: 41).  
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And one has to see that there are many points of discrimination to young people and 
immigrated people, so we have to work on that. That is the way we try – in fact more than 
other countries – to put money on these contracts. (F11) 
 
As these schemes have contributed to reduce open unemployment and as young 
people are not eligible to RMI (revenu minimum d’insertion) there are considerable 
incentives for policy makers to perpetuate insertion jobs. 
 
If you abandon the measure they would have nothing. Maybe that is the consequence of 
too many initiatives we had in that field. And if you would stop subsidizing we would have 
a very high unemployment rate. (EU25) 
 
However, these programs – particularly for the most disadvantaged groups – did 
not work as a bridge into regular employment (Barbier and Kaufmann 2008). The 
state’s intervention therefore had perverse effects: instead of preparing these groups 
to compete on the labour market, they produce new inactivity traps, characterized by 
permanent dependency and in-work poverty (Barbier and Fargion 2004: 449). 
Accordingly the state, in trying to fight inequality by tailor-made schemes for specific 
target group has reproduced social inequality along previous social boundaries. 
 
Similarities and Differences in Domestic Reform Paths 
 
In both countries there have been considerable reforms in employment policy. 
In Germany the reforms constitute a basic cognitive shift from securing highly 
productive workplaces towards promoting the inclusion of all citizens into the labour 
market. Supported by growing discourse on equal opportunities on the labour 
market, the focus was particularly on increasing job-take-up rates of the long-term 
unemployed. This means a radical institutional change from a system of professional 
status protection towards an active welfare stated based on individual responsibility 
for securing personal employability (cf. Lessenich 2008, Eichhorst et al. 2008, 
Dingeldey 2007). While even the most fundamental reforms of social protection have 
been legitimized by referring to this comprehensive activation paradigm, there has 
been no complementary debate on developing new forms of social protection for 
individuals with discontinuous employment records.  
To the contrary, in France there has been a broad debate on social cohesion and 
précarité but hardly any on activation. At the same time only incremental reforms ‘à 
la Français’ have been implemented successfully (Palier 2005: 141). At the centre of 
the reforms was not to develop an approach tailored to individual needs, but to 
improve the state’s intervention on the labour market (Clegg 2007). In these reforms 
rather than the individual, the state takes over the responsibility for insertion and 
individual social inclusion (Barbier and Kaufmann 2008). Thus, the problem of 
integrating low-qualified young people has been solved by demand-side active LMP 
rather than by improving qualifications and employability. This notion of ‘activation 
à la Français’ has contributed to a growing segment of subsidized labour demand that 
keeps low-qualified people dependent (Levy 2005: 104).  
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This one-sidedness of reforms – a focus on activation without considering 
complementary social security in Germany, the state’s responsibility to protect from 
precariousness without considering individual activation in France – has contributed 
to perpetuate the social segmentation of the labour market in both countries. Many 
of the reformed schemes were advantageous only for the privileged group of male, 
qualified workers, while proving at best ineffective for low-qualified long-term 
unemployed; finally referring them to an increasingly precarious segment at the 
margins of the labour market. At the most we may discover that the traditional 
boundaries between labour market insiders and non-employed outsiders have been 
transformed to new boundaries between a decreasing segment of well protected ‘core 
labour force’ and an increasing number of people at the margins of the labour 
market, employed in permanent precariousness.  
 
 
The Domestic Organization of European Employment Policy 
 
While both countries represent varieties of the Continental welfare state, there 
are important differences, particularly in the deeply institutionalized regulatory 
patterns of coordinating domestic policy (Kassim et al. 2000). Did the coordination 
demands by EES change these patterns as some authors had hoped for (Sabel and 
Zeitlin 2007, Eberlein and Kerwer 2004)? While it has been assumed that due to the 
integrated character of EES a closer cooperation across policy fields would emerge 
(Zeitlin 2009: 457), focusing on interministerial coordination, we expect that the EES 
will rather be organized according to the historically evolved, institutionalized 
patterns. 
 
Differences in Patterns of Interministerial Policy Co-ordination 
 
In Germany the inter-ministerial coordination between policy fields is 
traditionally organized horizontally, involving the ‘desk-office-level’, directly 
responsible for formulating respective policies (Derlien 2000). This mode of 
coordination relies heavily on the expertise and the competences of bureaucratic 
personnel. While the advantage of this mode may be pragmatic and appropriate 
solutions, it makes micro-political bargaining in between the ministries complex and 
a coherent national strategy, comprising multiple policy fields, almost impossible. By 
contrast, in France, traditionally a comprehensive strategy and coherent national 
policy making across policy fields is seen as an important task for hierarchic inter-
ministerial coordination (Kassim 2000: 244). The central coordinator for all policies 
concerning the EU is the secrétariat général des affaires européenne (SGAE)2 which was 
founded in 1948 and is a part of the prime minister’s office.  
 
Here we coordinate and, at last, we give the final position of France. (…) And the 
idea is that when somebody from France speaks at Brussels, he has always in front of him 
or her a sheet with the French position. And this sheet is made here by this secretariat. 
This idea is that when somebody speaks, it has to be in coherence with the rest. (F4) 
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The power of the SGAE is reflected by its authority “to send instructions to 
France’s Permanent Representation, even when only a single ministry is involved” 
(Kassim 2000a: 244). To what extend does the domestic organization of the EES 
reflect these patterns? 
 
Germany: Horizontal Co-ordination of European Employment Policy 
 
The Director-General of the LMP-department in the German Labour Ministry, 
is core member of the employment committee (EMCO) since 1997. But actually 
doing most of the substantial work is her alternate member – and at the same time 
her direct subordinate – the head of the policy unit ‘international LMP and encouraging 
job-take-up’3 (unit IIa2). This unit played a key role in the domestic coordination of 
EES. Unit IIa2 has asked all those policy units that they perceived would be 
concerned by the issues on the next EMCO meeting for their opinion (cf. Fig. 2).  
 
For example we have the policy field of childcare in the EES (…) – internationally 
strongly aligned to employment policy - but here dealt with by the Ministry of Education 
and mainly the Laender. And we try to involve these people as broadly as possible in 
advance and then develop a common position. (D1)* 
 
Unit IIa2 coordinates a joint German position which it would defend as best as 
possible ‘in Brussels’. However, having a negotiation mandate, it would also be able 
to formulate compromises.  
Also in downloading – here operationalized as the coordination of the national 
action plan (NAP) – it had a leading role (cf. Fig. 3). It has asked all potentially 
relevant units for drafts and contributions to the guidelines that refer to their policy 
field. After having received the contributions unit IIa2 has written a first draft which 
was communicated to all relevant actors in the field that have again been asked their 
opinions. In several steps they elaborated a final version which was send to the 
federal cabinet that formally agreed on the NAP.  
 
By the NAP the guidelines are diffused to the diverse policy fields. (…) I send the 
guidelines we have agreed on in Brussels to all colleagues affected. And I tell them, on the 
basis of these guidelines we have to draft a National Action Plan. This is the first of a 
multiplicity of communication channels that spread the knowledge of EES and the 
colleagues working on the guidelines then include them in the national policy. (D2)* 
 
Consequently, EES’s demands for coordination have been institutionalized 
according to the pre-existing horizontal pattern. But by establishing an ongoing 
coordination with diverse ministries – such as the Ministry of education, the Ministry 
of Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth, the Ministry of Social Affairs 
and the Ministry of Finance – a new perception of a mutual interdependency of these 
policies has evolved in Germany. Thus, on the inter-ministerial level the EES has 
contributed to a new opportunity structure for a more coherent reform of 
employment policy, transcendenting the traditional borders of LMP in Germany. 
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Figure 2: Downloading European Employment Policy Guidelines in Germany5 
 
 
 
France: Hierarchic Co-ordination of European Employment Policy 
 
The French coordination of EES shows a completely different picture. It has 
been much more hierarchic and by far less complex. Particularly two actors have 
taken a prominent role: the SGAE and the General Directorate of Employment 
(DGEFP, Délégation Générale à l’Emploi et la Formation Professionnelle). Even though the 
Director General of the DGEFP has been core member of EMCO, in the uploading 
process he could not substantially formulate the position of France towards the EES. 
Rather the SGAE claimed directive authority (cf. Fig. 4).  
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When France is formulating an official political position, which we forward to the 
commission, it has to pass the office of the prime minister (…) so before going to the 
EMCO we always talk to the SGAE about the French position presented in the 
committee. It is a bit weird, but we have to take into account the French position. (F 1) 
 
Additionally, contrary to Germany, the Permanent Representation was a member 
of EMCO, paying attention that the French position and the orders by the SGAE 
would not be jeopardized.  
 
This is an informal way for us to have cohesion between Paris and the representation 
in the EMCO. (…) That is to help our colleagues from Paris: Explaining to them the 
subject in order to get a more clear view when they speak to other people. (F 11) 
 
Since the beginning of 2004, also in downloading the SGAE has taken a leading 
role (cf. Fig. 5). While the NAP played a major role for the domestic employment 
policy, it was not perceived as a European plan, but as a national instrument to 
coordinate a coherent, national employment policy. As a consequence, an iterative 
coordination of the NAP was not perceived as necessary The affected ministries’ 
contributions have directly been compiled to a government plan by the SGAE and 
the Prime Minister’s Office. 
 
We coordinate the positions and define them. (…) Thus we have the role to give 
coherence to all this towards the council. (…) We coordinate and it is us who have send this 
to the commission. It is here where the NAP is made. It is us, who have written the NAP. 
(…) We have coordinated all Ministries (…) We have presented the fiche to all concerned 
ministries, collected their remarks and we have send the commission our comments. (F 4)* 
 
Thus the EES in France has not only been organized according to the traditional 
patterns of hierarchic coordination but it has even contributed to a further step of 
centralizing policy making by giving the SGAE a say on domestic employment 
policy. 
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Different Institutional Strategies of Institutional Entrepreneurs 
 
We have seen that the domestic co-ordination of EES has been organized 
according to historically evolved, deeply institutionalized patterns in both countries, 
creating completely different opportunity structures. We expect that these 
opportunity structures favour different strategies of appropriating European 
resources: To what extend did institutional entrepreneurs use European resources? 
And which strategy did they pursue? 
 
Germany: Discursive Strategy by a Strong Institutional Entrepreneur  
 
In Germany, unit IIa2 not only was a pivotal actor within EES but it also had a 
stake in the domestic reform process. Being in the tradition of bureaucratic policy 
formulation (Derlien 2000), they were actively seeking to change employment policy. 
 
We as policy advisors – and eventually this is what we are – we are those transporting 
these insights. We make the reports, we make the drafts, we propose something, at the same 
time we actively structure the process within the EU. (D 1)* 
 
Thus, unit IIa2 has used its focal position, in order to influence the reforms of 
domestic employment policy. By referring to European resources, this institutional 
entrepreneur was able to consolidate its position within the field and increasingly 
improve its relevance beyond the narrow confines of labour market policy.  
 
It has been annoying; it has almost been a running joke. At each and every situation 
they came up with referring to the European guidelines: ‘But Europe has said this, but 
Europe has said that’. Yes, this has been getting on our nerves. (D 10)* 
 
As a consequence of the horizontal coordination a discursive strategy of 
redefining the problems of employment policy has been particularly successful. This 
unit – being directly responsible for ‘encouraging job-take-up’ – has tried to reframe the 
reform agenda towards removing all institutional and individual barriers against job-
take-up.  
 
We have used the guidelines in saying: this is what the EU has agreed on, this path 
we have to go. (D 1)* 
 
There are many topics where we have used this as an amplifier, in order to show: this 
is what we want and this is consistent with the European Employment Strategy. (D 3)* 
 
Unit IIa2 therefore has not been a passive information interface but as skilled 
actor has influenced the institutionalization process on the European level and used 
these resources to influence the domestic reform process by a discursive strategy.  
 
At least for many parts of LMP we do – at least to a certain degree - both. (…) We 
are represented at the European level but we are also directly involved in domestic law 
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making procedures. And we are directly responsible for certain areas in the field labour 
market policy. (…) When we are involved in legislative processes, we take care that the 
guidelines are considered. We have been involved in all those reforms: JobAqtiv, Hartz I, 
II, and III, not as responsible unit but we have been closely involved. (D2)* 
 
Additionally, by a regulatory strategy, in horizontal coordination of the guideline 
process, as an unintended consequence, they started to establish an inter-ministerial 
field of integrated employment policy. 
  
We are a kind of ‘hybrid’ if you like. On the one hand we are those that represent 
German interests in the committees in Brussels, and on the other we are those transporting 
these guidelines into the domestic field. And we try to make them sensitive to that. (…) 
You have to tell your colleagues: ‚look, this is important for you’ (…) If a new law is on its 
way you have to communicate: ‘look, we also need to consider the guidelines’. (D2)* 
 
This hybrid role has allowed the institutional entrepreneur to actively create 
European guidelines it could then use for influencing the domestic debate. An 
example that occurred in many interviews was childcare. 
 
Of course, while formulating the guidelines, indicators and recommendations, we try to 
construct them in a way that is favourable to our political needs, and could be supportive in 
the national context. (D6) 
 
The guideline on childcare was the single case, where the German delegation in 
the EMCO did rather frankly opt for quantitative indicators and guidelines 
(interviews EU1, D1). In the Hartz-IV reform this guideline has been included in the 
negotiations with the municipalities who are in charge of granting child-care facilities. 
Finally, this has resulted in an entitlement for childcare for under three year old from 
2013 on.  
 
We have agreed that increasing female participation in employment clearly is a major 
challenge for Germany and that childcare is an important topic. (…) But the commission is 
rather critic on some things as the tax system, standard marital status reliefs 
(Ehegattensplitting), we say this is completely misunderstood. (D1)* 
 
This indicates a selective appropriation by the institutional entrepreneur. Only if 
he has perceived the European resources as useful for his change project did he 
actively use them in the domestic interactions. If he was not convinced of the reform 
necessity, he conceived of the European demands as ‘misunderstanding’.  
 
France: Programmatic Strategy and Competing Institutional Entrepreneurs 
 
As a consequence of the dual structure of coordination we may expect two 
institutional entrepreneurs in the French employment policy field. In fact, two actors 
– the SGAE and the DGEFP – have competed for dominance. But contrary to 
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Germany, the department in charge of employment policy conceived of themselves 
as passive executives rather than active policy advisors. 
 
The government makes the policy and we are in charge of applying it. (F1) 
 
Additionally, as European resources have not been legitimate in the domestic 
field, the actors could not explicitly refer to them. Have European resources been 
used despite these circumstances? We expect that by a programmatic strategy the 
DGEFP may use the EES as inspiration for domestic reforms without conceding 
this publicly, while the SGAE by a regulatory strategy has increased its coordinative 
position.  
 
When the government is formulating its employment policy (…) they don’t tell the 
French: ‘These measures I am applying come from the European context’. (…) In reality 
they use the guidelines extensively when elaborating the details of the schemes (F 12*) 
 
While for the OMC/Social Inclusion France has been very successful in 
uploading its concepts to the European level (Preunkert and Zirra 2009), in 
employment policy the imperative mandate has impeded the DGEFP to successfully 
negotiate on the European level. On the domestic level, it was subordinate to the 
policy priorities of the Minister’s cabinet. However, within the general policy 
framework the DGEFP, which is also directly in charge of the French PES, had 
considerable discretion for delegated legislation. Thus, in fields of direct 
responsibility, it could use European resources as a ‘secret’ source of inspiration for 
programmatic reforms in employment policy (interviews F1, F3, F4, F12). However, 
these resources have been actively appropriated and strongly re-interpreted according 
to pre-existing French concepts. 
 
There is a set of ideas in these guidelines that have been integrated in the greater axis 
of French employment policy: ‘making work pay’ or the modernization of the PES. (F4)* 
 
This proves a high cognitive selectivity of the domestic perception of European 
resources. Particularly the term ‘making work pay’ has been interpreted as enforcing 
the French way in employment policy: it has not been perceived as means to sanction 
unemployed but in terms of a guarantee of higher wages for people working on low-
incomes. 
 
This more preventive policy (…) this has really (…) been influenced by the EES, 
which has been a guideline, which gave orientation to our reforms, particularly in terms of 
‘making work pay’. (F3)* 
 
The SGAE, in contrast, has pursued a regulatory strategy in order to increase its 
stake in domestic policy coordination. While traditionally responsible for 
coordinating international policy, by using the plans, reports and evaluations of EES 
it has increasingly become an actor in coordinating domestic employment policy. 
Hence, the NAP – coordinated by the SGAE in the prime minister’s office – has 
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been presented as a national governmental plan on employment. Using statistics, 
benchmarks and indicators as a resource, by this regulatory strategy, the prime 
minister’s office succeeded in strengthening its national control capacity, particularly 
in respect to the regions.  
 
The national European Funds are particularly important for the regions as they co-
finance the employment policy, formation and insertion (…) while being national 
competences, these policies are implemented (mises en œuvre) by the regions. (…) The 
programs of the ESF contribute to implementing the national action plan, which identifies 
the general agenda of French employment policy. (F5)* 
 
Thus, in France, the prime minister’s office has used the NAP not to report to 
the EU but as centralized instrument of planning in order to give coherence to 
French employment policy and to implement genuinely national priorities in 
employment policy. Eventually, this coordination may contribute to a concerted and 
coherent reform of French employment policy. However, only most recently there 
might be indications for this development – which is still strongly contested by many 
domestic actors. 
 
Coordination Structure, Actors’ Strategies and Institutional Reform 
 
We have expected that if the EES has affected domestic reform processes, the 
differences in national welfare state reforms could be explained by different strategies 
of appropriation. Did we find evidence for this hypothesis? In Germany, fostered by 
the active role of civil servants in policy formulation, the institutional entrepreneur 
was a unit in the labour ministry, which has been responsible for European as well as 
domestic employment policy. By actively referring to discursive resources of 
‘activation’ this unit (‘international labour market policy and encouraging job-take-up’) 
has consolidated its relevance in the domestic reform process. Relying on a 
regulatory strategy, the horizontal coordination process has fostered the formation of 
a new interministerial field of integrated employment policy that accounts for the 
mutual interdependencies between employment and financial, economic, social as 
well as family policies. However, in the long run, this complex interministerial 
bargaining may prove inefficient for formulating a coherent German position in 
European committees as each ministry and unit pursues its own goals. In contrast, 
the EES has been used by the prime minister’s office to increase domestic 
employment policy coordination’s centrism in France. In actively referring to 
authoritative resources, the SGAE has extended its coordination role to domestic 
policy making. While this centralism impedes from using discursive resources, it may 
raise the potential of coherent reforms in the long run. In the timeframe investigated, 
however, a programmatic strategy of the DGEFP has been most effective. While 
being restricted in its discretion on the European level as well as in domestic policy 
making, by actively appropriating and re-interpreting programmatic resources, this 
actor has contributed to reforming delegated legislation in active employment policy. 
This made the multiple programs of job insertion more coherent and tailored to the 
needs of specific target groups. In both countries, however, the appropriation of 
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EES’ recourses has been strongly selective. European resources have only become 
relevant if the institutional entrepreneur did perceive an advantage in using them. 
Furthermore, the hope connected to the EES of opening the rather close 
coordination structures in Continental countries cannot be supported by our 
findings. To the contrary, European resources have improved the position of actors 
who have been strong from the beginning. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this paper we have analyzed the impact of different nationally institutionalized 
patterns of bureaucratic coordination on Europeanization – i.e. the domestic 
appropriation of European resources. We have started by a puzzle of welfare state 
reform: While Germany and France are both considered Continental countries facing 
similar challenges, the institutional reforms in these countries varied considerably. In 
order to explain these differences we borrowed from an actor centered 
institutionalism. Accordingly, organizations that seek to structure their institutional 
environment in mutual interactions constitute an organizational field. In this practice, 
skilled social actors reflexively use institutions as a resource for their actions and 
thereby reproduce these institutions. In order to improve their relevance for future 
interaction – i.e. to become more relevant in the eyes of the other actors involved – 
they can rely on three distinct but mutually not exclusive institutional strategies.  
In using this approach, we have reconstructed the national organization of EES 
and the role of different institutional entrepreneurs in Germany and France – two 
Continental countries that face similar challenges in employment policy but differ 
considerably in their patterns of policy coordination. We showed that the EES has 
provided an important resource for these skilled actors that they have used for 
influencing institutional reforms. However, the national organization of EES has 
largely reproduced or even strengthened pre-existing differences in coordination. 
Thus, these different institutional arrangements might contribute to explaining the 
variety in domestic reforms of employment policy. While this analysis does neither 
imply that these institutional entrepreneurs were the only actors working in favor of 
reforms, nor that the EES was the only resource for the actors’ strategies, it became 
evident that in both countries the EES has contributed considerably to the path of 
institutional reform. But against its claims to open institutionalized patterns of 
coordination European resources have privileged actors that have already been in a 
strong position before. They provided these actors with additional resources if they 
would pursue goals according to EES’ guidelines. By creative appropriation, 
concepts, world views and ‘ways of doing things’, that had been institutionalized on 
the European level, have become relevant resources for institutional reforms. 
However, while Europe constitutes an increasingly important factor in national 
policy making, it does neither automatically produce desired outcomes nor desired 
(or desirable) coordination structures. We may thus speak of an unintended 
Europeanization of domestic employment policy. 
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1  Interview citations marked by an * have been translated by the authors. 
 
2  Before October 2005 named Secrétariat général du Comité interministériel pour les questions de 
coopération économique européenne (SCGI) 
 
3  Authors’ translation of: ‘Internationale Arbeitsmarktpolitik und Förderung der 
Beschäftigungsaufnahme‘ 
 
4 Charts 2 to 4 apply to the process in 2004, but in both countries for EES little has changed since 
then. Abbrivations: Referat internationale AMP: Referat ‚international Arbeitsmarktpolitik und 
Förderung der Beschäftigungsaufnahme‘ in der Abteilung Arbeitsmarkt des Bundesministeriums für 
Wirtschaft und Arbeit (BMWA); Ministerium AS Brandenburg: Arbeits- und Sozialministerium des 
Landes Brandenburg. SGAE: Secrétariat général des affaires européenne, DARES: Direction de 
l’Animation de la Recherche, des Etudes et des Statistiques, DGEFP: Délégation générale de l'emploi 
et de la formation professionnelle, ANPE: Agence nationale pour l'emploi, CDSEI: Comité du 
dialogue social en Europe et international, DIACT: Délégation interministérielle à l'aménagement et à 
la compétitivité des territoires 
 
5 See endnote 4 
 
6 See endnote 4 
 
7 See endnote 4 
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